Adversarial Symbolic Execution for Detecting Concurrency-Related Cache
  Timing Leaks by Guo, Shengjian et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
03
28
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  9
 Ju
l 2
01
8
Adversarial Symbolic Execution for Detecting
Concurrency-Related Cache Timing Leaks
Shengjian Guo
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA, USA
Meng Wu
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA, USA
Chao Wang
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between
the fast CPU and the slow memory, may reveal sensitive informa-
tion of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-
channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting timing leaks ei-
ther ignore cache all together or focus only on passive leaks gen-
erated by the program itself, without considering leaks that are
made possible by concurrently running some other threads. In this
work, we show that timing-leak-freedom is not a compositional
property: a program that is not leaky when running alone may
become leaky when interleaved with other threads. Thus, we de-
velop a new method, named adversarial symbolic execution, to de-
tect such leaks. It systematically explores both the feasible program
paths and their interleavings while modeling the cache, and lever-
ages an SMT solver to decide if there are timing leaks. We have
implemented our method in LLVM and evaluated it on a set of real-
world ciphers with 14,455 lines of C code in total. Our experiments
demonstrate both the efficiency of ourmethod and its effectiveness
in detecting side-channel leaks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Cryptanalysis and other attacks;
• Software and its engineering→ Software verification and
validation;
KEYWORDS
Side-channel attack, concurrency, cache, timing, symbolic execu-
tion
1 INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attacks are security attacks where an adversary ex-
ploits the dependency between sensitive data and non-functional
properties of a program such as the execution time [28, 43], power
consumption [44, 51], heat, sound [37], and electromagnetic radia-
tion [36, 57]. For timing side channels, in particular, there are two
main sources of leaks: variances in the number of executed instruc-
tions and variances in the cache behavior. Instruction-induced leaks
are caused by differences in the number and type of instructions
executed along different paths: unless the differences are indepen-
dent of the sensitive data, they may be exploited by an adversary.
Cache-induced leaks are caused by differences in the number of
cache hits and misses along different paths.
Existing methods for detecting timing leaks or proving their ab-
sence often ignore the cache all togetherwhile focusing on instruction-
induced leaks. For example, Chen et al. [23] used Cartesian Hoare
Logic [58] to prove the timing leak of a program is within a bound;
Antonopoulos et al. [8] used a similar technique that partitions
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Figure 1: Flow of our cache timing leak detector SymSC.
the set of program paths in a way that, if individual partitions
are proved to be timing attack resilient, the entire program is also
timing attack resilient. Unfortunately, these methods ignore the
cache-timing characteristics. Even for techniques that consider the
cache [12, 21, 25, 30, 46, 61], their focus has been on leaks mani-
fested by the program itself when running alone, without consid-
ering the cases when it is executed concurrently with some other
(benign or adversarial) threads.
In this work, we show side-channel leak-freedom, as a security
property, is not compositional. That is, a leak-free program when
running alone may still be leaky when it is interleaved with other
threads, provided that they share the memory subsystem. This is
the case even if all paths in the program have the same number
and type of instructions and thus do not have instruction-induced
timing leaks at all. Unfortunately, no existing method or tool is
capable of detecting such timing leaks.
We propose a new method, named adversarial symbolic execu-
tion, to detect such concurrency-related timing leaks. Specifically,
given a programwhere one thread conducts a security-critical com-
putation, e.g., by calling functions in a cryptographic library, and
another thread is (either accidentally or intentionally) adversarial,
our method systematically explores both paths in these threads
and their interleavings. The exploration is symbolic in that it cov-
ers feasible paths under all input values. During the symbolic ex-
ecution, we aim to analyze the cache behavior related to sensitive
data to detect timing leaks caused by the interleaving.
Figure 1 shows the flow of our leak detector named SymSC, which
takes the victim thread P , a potentially adversarial thread P ′, and
the cache configuration as input. If P ′ is not given, SymSC cre-
ates it automatically. While symbolically executing the program,
SymSC explores all thread paths and searches for an adversarial in-
terleaving of these paths that exposes divergent cache behaviors in
P . There are two main technical challenges. The first one is associ-
ated with systematic exploration of the interleaved executions of a
concurrent program so as not to miss any adversarial interleaving.
The second one is associated with modeling the cache accurately
while reducing the computational cost.
1
, , Shengjian Guo, Meng Wu, and Chao Wang
To address the first challenge, we developed a new algorithm for
adversarially exploring the interleaved executions while mitigat-
ing the path and interleaving explosions. Specifically, cache timing
behavior constraints, which are constructed on the fly during sym-
bolic execution, are leveraged to prune interleavings redundant for
detecting leaks and thus speed up the exploration.
To address the second challenge, we developed a technique for
modeling the cache behavior of a program based on the cache’s
type and configuration, as well as optimizations of the subsequent
constraint solving to reduce overhead. For each concurrent execu-
tion (an interleaving of the threads) denoted π = (in, sch), where
in is the sensitive data input and sch is the interleaving schedule,
we construct a logical constraint τt (in, sch) for every potentially
adversarial memory access t , to indicate when it leads to a cache
hit. Then, we seek two distinct values of the data input, in and in′,
for which the cache behaves differently: τt (in, sch) , τt (in
′
, sch),
meaning one of them is a hit but the other is a miss, and they are
due to differences in the sensitive data input.
We have implemented our method in a software tool based on
LLVM and the KLEE symbolic virtual machine [20], and evalu-
ated it on twenty benchmark programs. These security-critical pro-
grams are ciphers taken from cryptographic libraries in the public
domain; they have 14,455 lines of C code in total. Since these pro-
grams are crafted by domain experts, they do not have obvious
timing leaks when running alone, such as unbalanced branching
statements or variances in lookup-table accesses. However, our ex-
periments of applying SymSC show that they may still have timing
leaks when being executed concurrently with other threads.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We propose an adversarial symbolic execution method capa-
ble of detecting cache timing leaks in a security-critical pro-
gram when it runs concurrently with other threads.
• We implement and evaluate our method on real-world ci-
pher programs to demonstrate its effectiveness in detecting
concurrency-related timing leaks.
In the remainder of this paper, we first motivate our work us-
ing several examples in Section 2 and then provide the technical
background in Section 3.We present our detailed algorithms in Sec-
tions 4 and 5, which are followed by domain-specific optimizations
in Section 6 to reduce the computational overhead. We present our
experimental results in Section 7 and review the related work in
Section 8. Finally, we give our conclusions in Section 9.
2 MOTIVATION
In this section, we use examples to explain the difference between
self-leaking and concurrency-induced leaking.
2.1 A Self-leaking Program and the Repair
Figure 2(a) shows a program whose execution time is dependent
of the sensitive variable k. It is a revised version of the running
example used in [22], for which the authors proposed the leak-free
version shown in Figure 2(b). The two programs have the same set
of instructions but differ in where the highlighted load instruction
is located: line 5 in P and line 9 in Pr .
Consider executing the two programs under a 512-byte direct-
mapped cache with one byte per cache line, as shown in Figure 3.
The choice of one-byte-per-cache-line — same as in [22]— is meant
/* k is sensitive input */
1: char p[256];
2: unsigned char k;
3: char q[256];
4:
5: load reg1, p[k]
6: if (k <= 127)
7: load reg2, q[255-k]
8: else
9: load reg2, q[k-128]
10: add reg1, reg2
11: store reg1, p[k]
-----------------------------
k=0 : <miss, miss, miss>
1≤k≤255: <miss, miss, hit>
(a) The leaky program P
/* k is sensitive input */
1: char p[256];
2: unsigned char k;
3: char q[256];
4:
5: if (k <= 127)
6: load reg2, q[255-k]
7: else
8: load reg2, q[k-128]
9: load reg1, p[k]
10: add reg1, reg2
11: store reg1, p[k]
-----------------------------
0≤k≤255: <miss, miss, hit>
(b) The leak-free version Pr
Figure 2: A program with cache-timing leak (cf. [22]).
q[254]
......
q[1]
q[0]
k
p[255]
......
p[1]
p[0], q[255]
256 bytes
256 bytes
Figure 3: The direct-mapped cache layout (cf. [22]).
to simplify analysis without loss of generality. Specifically, the 256-
byte array p is associated with the first 256 cache lines, while vari-
able k is associated with the 257-th cache line. Due to the finite
cache size, q[255] has to share the cache line with p[0].
There are two program paths in P , each with three memory ac-
cesses: load (line 5), load (line 7 or line 9), and store (line 11).
However, depending on the value of k, these three memory ac-
cesses may exhibit different cache behaviors, thus causing data-
dependent timing variance.
Assume that k’s value is 0, executing P means taking the then
branch and accessing p[0], q[255], and p[0]. The first access to
p[0] is a cold miss since the cache is empty at the moment. The ac-
cess to q[255] is a conflict miss because the cache line (shared by
q[255] and p[0]) is occupied by p[0]; as a result q[255] evicts
p[0]. The next access to p[0] is also a conflict miss since the
cache line is occupied by q[255]. All in all, the cache behavior
is <miss,miss,miss> for k=0.
This sequence is also unique in that all other values of k would
produce <miss,miss,hit> as shown at the bottom of Figure 2(a).
This means P , when running alone, leaks information about k. For
example, upon observing the delay caused by <miss,miss,miss>
via monitoring, an adversary may infer that k’s value is 0.
Program Pr is a repaired version [22] where the load is moved
from line 5 to line 9 as in Figure 2(b). Thus, the load accessing p[k]
at line 9 always generates a cold miss (0<k≤255) or a conflict miss
(k=0). Consequently, the store at line 11 is always a hit. Thus, for
all values of k, the cache behavior remains <miss,miss,hit> – no
information of k is leaked.
2.2 New Leak Induced by Concurrency
Although Pr is a valid repair when the program is executed sequen-
tially, the situation changes when it is executed concurrently with
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/* [Thread T1] */
1: char p[256];
2: unsigned char k;
3: char q[256];
4:
5: if (k <= 127)
6: load reg2, q[255-k]
7: else
8: load reg2, q[k-128]
9: load reg1, p[k]
10: add reg1, reg2
11: store reg1, p[k]
/* [Thread T2] */
12: unsigned char tmp;
13: load reg3, tmp
14: ...
Figure 4: Concurrent program with side-channel leak.
q[254]
......
q[1]
q[0]
k
p[255]
......
p[1] , tmp
p[0], q[255]
p[k]
p[k]
q[255-k]
T1
tmp
T2
Figure 5: Interleaving 6-9-13-11 and the cache layout.
other threads. Specifically, if we use one thread (T1) to execute Pr
while allowing a second thread (T2) to run concurrently, Pr may
exhibit new timing leaks.
Figure 4 shows a two-threaded program comprising T1 and an
adversarial T2 that accesses a new variable tmp. Assume tmp is
mapped to the same cache line as p[1]. Then, it is possible for
T2 to cause T1 to leak information of its secret data. There are var-
ious ways of mapping tmp to the same cache line as p[1], e.g., by
dynamically allocating the memory used by tmp or invoking a re-
cursive (or non-recursive) function within which tmp is defined as
a stack variable.
Table 1 shows the six interleavings of threads T1 and T2. The
left half of this table contains three interleavings whereT1 took the
then branch of the if-statement, while the right half contains three
interleavings whereT1 took the else branch. In each case, the four
columns show the ID, the execution order, the cache sequence of
threadT1, and the value range of k. For example, in 6-9-11-13, the
store at line 11 is a cache hit because its immediate predecessor
(line 9) already loads p[k] into the cache. Since the last load at
line 13 comes from threadT2, the cache behavior sequence ofT1 is
<miss,miss,hit>, denoted <m,m,h> for brevity.
Table 1: Interleavings and thread T1’s cache sequences.
ID Interleaving Cache-seq k ID Interleaving Cache-seq k
1 6-13-9-11 <m,m,h> [0,127] 4 8-13-9-11 <m,m,h> (127,255]
2 6-9-11-13 <m,m,h> [0,127] 5 8-11-9-13 <m,m,h> (127,255]
3 6-9-13-11 <m,m,h> [0,1)∪(1,127] 6 8-9-13-11 <m,m,h> (127,255]
<m,m,m> 1
Although context switches between the threads T1 and T2 may
occur at any time in practice, for the purpose of analyzing cache
timing leaks, we assume they occur only before the load and store
statements. Furthermore, we only focus on these memory accesses
when they are mapped to the same cache line, e.g., between the
load in T2 and statements that access p[k] in T1.
We use Figure 5 to show details of 6-9-13-11. The blue and
orange rectangles represent the load and store accesses, respec-
tively, and the red dashed poly-line shows their execution order.
The first three load operations all cause cache misses, whereas
the last store could be a cache hit if (k!=1) and a cache miss if
(k=1). When (k=1), the four memory accesses would be q[254],
p[1], tmp, and p[1]. The first two trigger cold misses. The third
one (tmp) triggers a conflict miss as the cache line was occupied by
p[1]. Evicting this cache line would then lead to another conflict
miss for the subsequent store to p[1].
The examples presented so far show that, even for a timing-leak-
free program (T1), running it concurrently with another thread (T2)
may cause it to exhibit new timing leaks. This is the case even if the
two threads (T1 andT2) are logically independent of each other. In
other words, they do not need to share variables or communicate
through messages; they can affect each other’s timing behaviors
by sharing the same cache system.
2.3 Adversarial Symbolic Execution
The goal of developing a new symbolic execution method is to de-
tect such timing leaks. More specifically, we are concerned with
two application scenarios for SymSC, depending on whether the
adversarial thread (T2) exists in the given program or not.
Case 1. Thread T2 is given, together with fixed addresses of the
memory region accessed byT2. In this case, T2 is an integral part of
the concurrent system that also contains the security-critical com-
putation in T1. Since the only source of nondeterminism is thread
interleaving, our tool aims to check if the concurrent system itself
has timing leaks.
Case 2. Thread T2 is not given, but created by our tool, and thus
the addresses of the memory region accessed by T2 are assumed to
be symbolic. This is when, inside the cache layout of Figure 5, the
address of tmp would be made symbolic, thus allowing it to be
mapped to any cache line (as opposed to be fixed to the 2nd line).
There are now two sources of non-determinism: thread interleav-
ing and memory layout. Our tool explores both to check if T1 may
leak information due to interference from T2.
In the second case, when T2 executes a memory load instruc-
tion t , for example, the symbolic address addr may be mapped to
any cache line. The purpose of having such aggressive adversar-
ial addressing is to allow SymSC to conduct a (predictive) what-if
analysis: it searches all potential memory layouts to check if there
exists one that allows T2 to cause a timing leak.
3 THE THREAT MODEL
We now review the technical background and present the threat
model, which defines what an adversary can or cannot do.
3.1 Cache and the Timing Side Channels
The execution time of a program depends on the CPU cycles taken
to execute the instructions and the time needed to access memory.
The first component is easy to compute but also less important
in practice, because security-critical applications often execute the
same set of instructions regardless of values of their sensitive vari-
ables [65]. In contrast, leaks are more likely to occur in the second
component: the time taken to access memory. Compared to the
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time needed to execute an instruction, which may be 1-3 clock cy-
cles, the time taken to access memory, during a cache miss, may
be tens or even hundreds of clock cycles.
There are different types of cache based on the size, associativity
and replacement policy. For ease of comprehension, we use direct-
mapped cache with LRU policy in this paper, but other cache types
may be handled similarly. Indeed, during our experiments, both
direct-mapped cache and 4-way set-associative cache were evalu-
ated and they led to similar analysis results.
We assume the security-critical program P implements a func-
tion c ← f (k, x), where k is the sensitive input (secret), x is the
non-sensitive input (public), and c is the output. In block ciphers,
for example, k would be the cryptographic key, x would be the
plaintext, c would be the ciphertext, and f would be the encryp-
tion or decryption procedure.
Let the execution time of P be τP (k,x). Since there may be mul-
tiple paths inside P , when referring to a particular path p ∈ P , we
use τp (k,x). But if there is no ambiguity, we may omit the detail
and simply use τ (k,x). We say P is leak-free if τ (k,x) remains the
same for all input values. That is,
∀x, k1,k2 . τ (k1, x) = τ (k2,x)
Here k1 and k2 are two arbitrary values of k . Since in practice, deci-
sion procedures (e.g., SMT solvers) are designed for checking sat-
isfiability, instead of proving the validity of a formula, we try to
falsify it by checking the formula below:
∃x, k1,k2 . τ (k1, x) , τ (k2,x)
Here, we search for two values of k that can lead to differences.
If the set of instructions executed by P remains the same, we
only need to check whether τ (k1,x) and τ (k2,x) have the same
number of cache hits and misses. Furthermore, in our threat model
where the attacker can only observe (passively) the execution time
of P , but not control or observe x , we can reduce the computational
cost by fixing a value x of x arbitrarily and then checking if τ (k1)
and τ (k2) have the same number of cache hits and misses.
3.2 Example of an Attack
Now, we show a concrete example of exploiting cache timing leaks
in concurrent systems. The goal is to illustrate what an adversary
may be able to achieve in practice.
Figure 6 shows a two-threaded program, its cache mapping, and
the thread-local control flows. Initially, T2 allocates a memory area
(buf) whose size matches the input. Although the input size may
be arbitrary, here, we assume it is an integral multiple of 64, e.g.,
1024 bytes (INPUT_SIZE=1024). In the while-loop (line 14) T2 reads
64 bytes from input every time to fill buf. Thread T1 tracks the
progress (idx) of T2 (line 4) and repeatedly retrieves 64-byte data
from buf to the array out (line 5). The encryption on out involves
the S-Box array S and a given key (lines 6-7). Once the data is en-
crypted, T1 sends it out (line 8). When T1 finds that buf runs out
of data, it sleeps for 50ms (line 10).
First, we explain why the program has a timing leak. We use a
32KB direct-mapped cache here and set each cache line to 64 bytes.
The S-Box array S hence maps to 4 cache lines and the buf array
maps to 16 cache lines. For brevity, we only focus on the important
arrays (S and buf) while assuming other variables do not affect
the cache mapping. Furthermore, we assume S and buf share one
cache line as highlighted in Figure 6.
uint8_t *buf = 0; uint32_t size = INPUT_SIZE; uint32_t idx = 0;
/* [Thread T1] */
1: uint8_t S[256] = {0x4b,...};
2: uint8_t out[64] = {0};
3: for(int i=0; i<size; )
4: if (i < idx)
5: memcpy(out,buf+i,64);
6: for (int j=0;j<64;j++,i++)
7: out[j] &= S[key[j]];
8: write(out, ...);
9: else
10: sleep(50);
/* [Thread T2] */
11: ......
12: buf=(uint8_t *)malloc(size);
13: while(idx<size)
14: memcpy(buf+idx,read(...),64);
15: idx+=64;
16: ......
......
S[192]-S[255]
S[128]-S[191]
S[64]-S[127]
S[0]-S[63] , buf[960]-buf[1023]
......
buf[0]-buf[63]
......
64 bytes
32KB
7
j<64
5
i<idx
10
i<size
T1
14
13
idx<size
T2
idx: 960
Figure 6: A two-threaded encryption program.
The graph in Figure 6 shows an interleaving of T1 and T2, where
the dotted red arrow represents a context switch after T2 executes
the memcpy statement (line 14) while T1 just reaches the for-loop
at line 6. The text above the arrow means idx’s value is 960 at the
moment, indicating thread T2 has just accessed the last 64 bytes of
buf at line 14.
After the context switch, T1 enters the for-loop (line 6) and reads
S[key[j]] at line 7. Note that the offset to S’s base address de-
pends on key[j], thus different keys may make thread T1 access
different items of S. We pick two 64-byte keys k1 and k2 which
differ in the first eight bits: 10000000 for k1 and 00000000 for k2.
Using k1, thread T1 first reads key[0] and S[128]. The access to
S[128] would lead to a cache hit if i is greater than 63. This is
because after the for-loop (lines 6-7) finishes once (i=64), S[128]
is already mapped to cache and no further accesses evict it.
In contrast, with k2, thread T1 loads S[0] which maps to the
cache line shared with buf[960-1023]. Recall that, before the con-
text switch, T2 just accessed the area starting from buf+idx (buf[960]).
Consequently T1’s access to S[0] causes a conflict miss because
the shared cache line was occupied by buf. Thus, we find a leak:
two keys (k1 and k2) leading to divergent cache behaviors at a pro-
gram location due to thread interleaving.
Next, we discuss how this leak may be exploited. The leak is
due to the sharing of cache between S and buf, which is crucial
to our threat model. In this program, S has a fixed size while buf
is dynamically allocated at run time based on the input data. Fur-
thermore, INPUT_SIZE is a variable affected by the external input.
Although the actual input size cannot be arbitrarily large in prac-
tice, for this exploit to work, it only needs to be larger than the
total cache size, which is 32KB.
Thus, the attacker could mutate the input to alter the buffer
size, hence affecting the memory layout. Furthermore, real applica-
tions sometimes use relatively large fixed buffers. For example, in
OpenSSH [5], the scp program has a 16KB buffer for COPY_BUFLEN
and the sftp program has a 32KB buffer for DEFAULT_COPY_BUFFER.
Moreover, OpenSSH’s SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX buffer for a socket chan-
nel is as large as 256MB. These large buffers allow room for attack-
ers to construct the desired cache layout.
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/* cipher-ctr-mt.c */
...
504:for(i=0;i<CIPHER_THREADS;i++){
......
507: pthread_create(...,
thread_loop,...);
......
509:}
/* cipher-ctr-mt.c */
238:static void*
239:thread_loop(void *x) {
......
326: for(i=0;i<KQLEN;i++) {
327: AES_encrypt(q->ctr,
q->keys[i],&key);
......
Figure 7: Concurrency-related code in HPN-SSH [2].
We have found a similar scenario in the open-source implemen-
tation of HPN-SSH [2], which is an enhancement of OpenSSH [5]
by leveraging multi-threading to accelerate the data encryption.
Figure 7 shows the code snippet directly taken from theHPN-SSH [2]
repository: On the left-hand side are threads created to run the
thread_loop function, shown on the right-hand side, which re-
peatedly calls AES_encrypt to encrypt data given by the user (line
327). By controlling the size and content of the data, as well as
the number of threads, a malicious user is able to affect both the
memory layout and the thread interleaving.
In our experimental evaluation (Section 7), we will show that
the AES subroutine from OpenSSL indeed has cache timing leaks,
which may subject HPN-SSH to attack scenarios similar to the one
illustrated in Figure 6.
4 ADVERSARIAL SYMBOLIC EXECUTION
We first present the baseline algorithm for concurrent programs.
Then, we enhance it to search for cache timing leaks.
4.1 The Baseline Algorithm
Following Guo et al. [40], we assume the entire program consists of
a finite set {T1, . . . ,Tn} of threads where each threadTi (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
is a sequential program. Without loss of generality, we assume T1
is critical and any of T2, . . . ,Tn may be adversarial. Let st be an
instruction in a thread. Let event e = 〈tid, l , st , l ′〉 be an instance
of st , where l and l ′ are thread-local locations before and after exe-
cuting st . A global location is a tuple s = 〈l1, . . . , ln〉 where each li
is a location inTi . Depending on the type of st , an event may have
one of the following types:
• α-event, which is an assignment vl := expl where vl is a
local variable and expl is an expression in local variables.
• β-event, which is a local branch denoted assume(cond l )where
the condition condl is expressed in local variables.
• γ -event, which is a load from global memory of the form
vl := vд , a store to global memory of the form vд := expl ,
or a thread synchronization operation.
For an if(c)-else statement, we use assume(c) to denote the then-
branch, and assume(¬c) to denote the else-branch. Since c is ex-
pressed in local variables or local copies of global variables, β-events
are local branching points whereas γ -events are thread interleav-
ing points. Both β- and γ -events contribute to the state-space ex-
plosion problem. In contrast,α-events are local to their own threads.
Details on handling of language features such as pointers and func-
tion calls are omitted, since they are orthogonal issues addressed
by existing symbolic execution tools [20, 26].
Algorithm 1 shows the baseline symbolic execution procedure
that follows the prior work [14, 26, 40] except that, for the purpose
of detecting timing leaks, it considers two events as dependent also
when they are mapped to the same cache line. Here, an execution
is characterized by π = (in, sch)where in = {k,x} is the data input
and sch is the thread schedule, corresponding to a total order of
events e1 . . . en , and Stack is a container for symbolic states. Each
s ∈ Stack is a tuple 〈M, pcon, branch, enabled, crt〉, whereM is the
symbolic memory, pcon is the path condition, branch is the set of
branching (β ) events, enabled is the set of thread interleaving (γ )
events, and crt is the event chosen to execute at s .
Algorithm 1: Baseline Symbolic Execution Procedure.
Initially: State stack Stack = ∅;
Start SymSC(s0 ) with the initial symbolic state s0.
1 SymSC(State s )
2 begin
3 Stack.push(s );
4 if s is a thread-local branching point then
5 for t ∈ s .branch and s .pcon ∧ t is satisfiable do
6 SymSC(NextSymbolicState(s , t )); // β event
7 end
8 else if s is a thread interleaving point then
9 for t ∈ s .enabled do
10 SymSC(NextSymbolicState(s , t )); // γ event (enhanced)
11 end
12 else if s is other sequential computation then
13 SymSC(NextSymbolicState(s , s .cr t )); // α event
14 else
15 terminate at s ;
16 end
17 Stack.pop();
18 end
19 NextSymbolicState(State s , Event t )
20 begin
21 s .cr t ← t ;
22 s ′ ← Execute the event t in the state s ;
23 return s ′;
24 end
At the beginning, the stack is empty and the entry is the initial
state s0. Then, depending on the type of the state s , wemay execute
a local branch (line 4), perform a context switch (line 8), or execute
a sequential computation (line 12). In all cases, SymSC is invoked
again on the new state.
Sub-procedure NextSymbolicState takes the current state s and
to-be-executed event t as input, and returns the new state s ′ as
output: s ′ is the result of executing t at s . We omit details since
they are consistent with existing symbolic execution methods [39–
41, 66, 67].
Also note that, in the prior work, symbolic execution would al-
low interleavings between global (γ ) events only if they have data
conflicts, i.e., they are from different threads, accessing the same
memory location, and at least one of them is a write. This is be-
cause only such accesses may lead to different states if they are
executed in different orders. However, in our case, whether these
events are mapped to the same cache line also matters.
4.2 Enhanced Algorithm
We enhance the baseline algorithm to arrive at Algorithm 2, where
themain difference is in the interleaving points. Upon entering the
for-loop at line 5, we first check if an enabled event t may lead to
a timing leak by invoking DivergentCacheBehavior(s,t). Details of
the subroutine will be presented in Section 5, but at the high level,
it constructs a cache behavior constraint τt and then searches for
two values, k1 and k2, such that τt (k1) , τt (k2).
Since detecting such divergent behaviors is computationally ex-
pensive, prior to invoking the subroutine, we make sure that event
t indeed may be involved in an adversarial interleaving. This is
determined by AdversarialAccess(s,t) which checks if (1) t comes
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from the critical thread T1 and (2) there exists a previously exe-
cuted event t ′ = s ′.crt where s ′ ∈ Stack and the two events (t and
t ′) are mapped to the same cache line.
Algorithm 2: Symbolic Execution in SymSC
Initially: State stack Stack=∅;
Start SymSC(s0 ) with the initial symbolic state s0 .
1 SymSC(State s )
2 begin
3 ......
4 else if s is a global-memory access point then
5 for t ∈ s .enabled do
6 if DivergentCacheBehavior(s , t ) then
7 generate test case;
8 terminate at s ;
9 else
10 SymSC(NextSymbolicState(s , t ));
11 end
12 end
13 ......
14 end
15
16 DivergentCacheBehavior (State s , Event t )
17 begin
18 if AdversarialAccess(s , t ) then
19 τt ← compute t ’s cache hit constraint;
20 if ∃k, k′ such that τt (k) , τt (k
′) then
21 return true;
22 end
23 return false;
24 end
25
26 AdversarialAccess(State s , Event t )
27 begin
28 if t is from the critical thread then
29 let s ′ ∈ Stack and t ′ = s ′.crt;
30 if ∃t ′ . t and t ′ may map to same cache line then
31 return true;
32 return false;
33 end
For our running example in Figure 4, in particular, Algorithm 2
would explore the first three interleavings in Table 1 before detect-
ing the leak. The process is partially illustrated by Figure 8, where
events t1:load q[255-k], t2:load p[k] and t3:store p[k] belong
to thread T1 whereas t4:load tmp belongs to thread T2.
Assume T1 executes t1 to reach t2 and T2 is about to execute t4:
this corresponds to the figure on the left. At this moment, s.enabled
= { t2, t4 }. If t4 is executed before t2, AdversarialAccess(s ,t2) would
evaluate to true because t2 comes from the critical thread and p[k]
may be mapped to the same cache line as tmp accessed by t4. How-
ever, there is no timing leak at t2, because p[k] differs from t1’s
access q[255-k], meaning the cache behavior at t2 remains the
same for all values of k .
If t2 were executed before t4, we would have the second scenario
in Figure 8. At this moment, s.enabled = { t3, t4 }. If t4 is executed
after t3, the interleaving would be 6-9-11-13, which does not have
timing leaks either. But if t4 were executed before t3, we would
have the third scenario in Figure 8, where AdversarialAccess(s, t3)
evaluates to true, τt3 (k) evaluates to false for (k=1) but to true for
(k,1)∧(k≤127), as shown in Table 2, leading to divergent cache
behaviors in 6-9-13-11.
5 ADVERSARIAL CACHE ANALYSIS
Our method for detecting divergent cache behaviors is as follows.
First, it constructs the behavioral constraint for each memory ac-
cess. Then, it solves the constraint to compute a pair of sensitive
values that allow the constraint to return divergent results.
p[k]
p[k]
q[255-k]
T1
tmp
T2
p[k]
p[k]
q[255-k]
T1
tmp
T2
p[k]
p[k]
q[255-k]
T1
tmp
T2
Figure 8: The three interleavings generated by SymSC.
5.1 Cache Modeling
Recall that the entire program contains T1 and T2, among other
threads, where T1 invokes the critical computation and T2 is po-
tentially adversarial. During symbolic execution, SymSC conducts
context switches when load or store instructions may be mapped
to the same cache line. Here, each interleaving p corresponds to a
data input in and a thread schedule sch. The data input is divided
further into in = {k,x}, where k is sensitive (secret) and x is non-
sensitive (public). Whenever the value of x is immaterial, we as-
sume in = {k}.
• An interleaving p is a sequence of memory accesses denoted
p(sch, in) = {A1, ...,An} where sch represents the order of
these accesses and in represents the data input.
• Each Ai , where i ∈ [0,n], denotes a memory access.
• pconi (k) is the path condition under which Ai is reached.
Thus, when pconi (k) is true, meaning Ai is reachable, we check
if Ai can lead to a cache hit:
• τi (k) denotes the condition under whichAi triggers a cache
hit.
• addri denotes the memory address accessed by Ai .
• taд(addr ) is a function that returns the unique taд of addr .
• line(addr ) is a function that returns the cache line of addr .
Thus, we define the cache-hit condition as follows:
τi (k) ≡
∨
0≤j<i
(
taд(addr j ) = taд(addri ) ∧
∀l ∈ [j+1, i−1]
line(addrl) , line(addri)
)
(1)
For each memory access Ai , SymSC traverses the preceding mem-
ory accesses in the interleaving p to see if any such Aj may result
inAi being a cache hit. This is done by comparing the tag of addri
to that of addr j—a hit is possible only when two tags are the same.
Furthermore, any other memory access (Al ) between Ai and Aj
must not evict the cache line occupied by Aj (and hence Ai ). This
means, for all j < l < i , we have line(addrl) , line(addri).
If Ai always causes a cache hit, or a miss, it cannot leak sen-
sitive information because it implies ∀k1,k2 . τi (k1) = τi (k2). In
contrast, if τi (k) evaluates to true for some value of k but to false
for a different value of k , then it is a leak.
5.2 Leakage Detection
After constructing τi (k), which is the cache-hit condition for a po-
tentially adversarial memory access Ai , we instantiate the sym-
bolic expression twice, first with a fresh variable k1 and then with
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Table 2: Cache-related information of interleaving p.
# line i pconi addri τi cache
6 0 k ≤ 127 q[255-k] false miss
9 1 k ≤ 127 p[k] taд(p[k]) = taд(q[255 − k]) miss
13 k ≤ 127 tmp
taд(tmp) = taд(p[k])∨
2
(
taд(tmp) = taд(q[255 − k]) miss
∧line(tmp) , line(p[k])
)
11 k ≤ 127 p[k]
taд(p[k]) = taд(tmp)∨ miss
3
(
taд(p[k]) = taд(p[k]) or
∧ line(p[k]) , line(tmp)
)
hit
another fresh variable k2. We use an off-the-shelf SMT solver to
search for values of k1 and k2 that can lead to divergent behaviors.
Precise Solution. The precise formulation is as follows:
∃k1,k2 . (k1 , k2) ∧ τi (k1) , τi (k2) (2)
We need to conduct this check at every memory access Ai , where
i ∈ [0,n], along the symbolic execution path p. If the above for-
mula is satisfiable, the SMT solver will return values k1 and k2 of
variables k1 and k2, respectively.
Two-Step Approximation. Since computing both values at the
same time is expensive, in practice, we can take two steps:
• First, solve subformula ∃k1 . τi (k1) to compute a concrete
value for k1, denoted k1.
• Second, solve subformula ∃k2 . (k1 , k2) ∧ τi (k1) , τi (k2)
to compute a concrete value k2 for k2.
Since the formula solved in each step is (almost twice) smaller, the
solving time can be reduced significantly. Furthermore, a valid so-
lution (k1 and k2) is guaranteed to be a valid solution for the orig-
inal formula as well. However, in general, the two-step approach
is an under-approximation: when it fails to find any solution, it is
not a proof that no such solution exists.
To make the two-step approach precise, one would have to ap-
ply it repeatedly, each time with a different k1 computed in the
first step, until all solutions of k1 is covered. Nevertheless, we shall
show through experiments that, in practice, applying it once is of-
ten accurate enough to detect the actual leak.
5.3 The Running Example
We revisit the example in Figure 4 to show how our approach de-
tects the leak. Recall that SymSC would generate the six interleav-
ings shown in Table 1. For each interleaving, Table 2 shows the line
number (#line) of every access Ai , path condition pconi , memory
address addri , and the cache-hit constraint τi .
Inside the interleaving 6-9-13-11, for instance, upon reaching
the load of q[255-k] at line 6, the path condition would be (k ≤
127). Since it is the first memory access, τ0 must be false (cache
miss). We will record this memory address for further analysis.
Next is the load of p[k] at line 9. SymSC builds τ1 and checks its
satisfiability. Since p[k] and the preceding q[255-k] correspond
to different memory addresses, the taд comparison in τ1 returns
false, indicating a cache miss. The load at line 13 accesses tmp.
Since tmp is different from any of the elements in arrays p and q,
the taд comparisons in τ2 return false, making A2 a cache miss.
Similarly, τ3 for the store at line 11 is shown in the last row of
Table 2. It is worth mentioning that τ3 only compares p[k] (addr3)
1 uint8_t SBOX1[64]={0x6f,0x3c,0x77,0xb7,0x2f,0x7b,0x5f,0xc6, ...};
2 uint8_t SBOX2[64]={0x3d,0x4c,0x5f,0xb6,0xd1,0xff,0x3e,0xed, ...};
3 void encrypt(uint8_t *block){
4 for (uint8_t i = 0; i < 64; i++){
5 block[i] |= SBOX1[block[i]];
6 block[i] ^= SBOX2[block[i]];
7 }
8 }
Figure 9: Example code for accessing S-Box lookup tables.
with tmp (addr2) and p[k] (addr1) but not q[255-k] (addr0) be-
cause SymSC finds that, if the access to tmp does not evict the cache
line used by its preceding access to p[k] (addr1), the last store to
p[k] (addr3) must be a cache hit; SymSC stops here to avoid further
(and unnecessary) analysis.
Differing from τ0, τ1 and τ2, the constraint τ3 depends on k due
to the constraint line(p[k]) , line(tmp). Specifically, τ3(k) is true
when (k! = 1 ∧ k ≤ 127) and is false when (k = 1).
In SymSC, two symbolic variables k1,k2 will be used to substi-
tutek in the symbolic expression of τ3(k), to form τ3(k1) and τ3(k2).
Solving the satisfiability problem described by τ3(k1) XOR τ3(k2)
would produce the assignment {k1=0 andk2=1}, whichmakes τ3(0)
evaluate to true and τ3(1) evaluate to false.
6 OPTIMIZATIONS
Symbolic execution, when applied directly to cipher programs,may
have a high computational overhead because of the heavy use of
arithmetic computations and look-up tables in these programs. In
this section, we present techniques for reducing the overhead.
Toward this end, we have two insights. First, when conducting
cache analysis, we are not concerned with the actual numerical
computations inside the cipher unless they affect the addresses of
memory accesses that may depend on sensitive data, e.g., indices of
lookup tables such as S-Boxes. Second, for the purpose of detecting
leaks, as opposed to proving their absence, we are free to under-
approximate as long as it does not diminish the leak-detection ca-
pability of our analysis.
6.1 Domain-specific Reduction
By studying real-world cipher programs, we have found the com-
putational overhead is often associated with symbolic indices of
lookup tables such as the one shown in Figure 9.
Here, block points to a 8-byte storage area whose content de-
pends on the cryptographic key; thus, the eight bytes are initial-
ized with symbolic values. Accordingly, indices to the S-Box tables
– block[i] at line 4 – are symbolic. However, not all memory ac-
cesses should be treated as symbolic. For example, the address of
block[i] itself, and the address of local variables such as i should
be treated as concrete values to reduce the cost of symbolic exe-
cution. Therefore, we conduct a static analysis of the interleaved
execution tracep to identify the sequence of memory accesses that
need to be kept symbolic while avoiding the symbolic expressions
of other unnecessary memory addresses.
Also, a programmay have multiple S-Box arrays, like SBOX1 and
SBOX2 in Figure 9. Two successive accesses to SBOX1 and SBOX2 (at
lines 5 and 6) cannot form a cache hit no matter what the lookup
indices are. Therefore, we do not need to invoke the SMT solver to
7
, , Shengjian Guo, Meng Wu, and Chao Wang
check the equivalence of these symbolic addresses. This can signif-
icantly cut down the constraint-solving time.
6.2 Layout-directed Reduction
Another reduction is guided by thememory layout. In LLVM,mem-
ory layout may be extracted from the compiler back-end after the
code generation step. Recall that when analyzing a pair of poten-
tially adversarial addresses, we need to compare themwith all other
addresses accessed between them to build the cache behavior con-
straint. More specifically, to check if A2 is a cache hit because of
A1 along the execution A1 − B1−, ...,−Bn − A2, we need to check
if any Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) could evict the cache line used by A1. Due to
the large value of n and often complex symbolic expression of Bi ,
the constraint-solving time could be large.
Our approach in this case is to directly compareA1 andA2 while
postponing the comparisons toBi . This is based on the observation
that, in practice, the cache line of A1 can possibly be evicted by Bi
only if the differences between their addresses is the multiple of
the cache size (e.g., 64KB), which may not be possible in compact
cipher programs. For example, in a 64KB direct-mapped cache, for
B1 to evict the 64-byte cache line ofA1, their address difference has
to be 216 = 64KB. In a 4-way set-associative cache, their address
difference has to be 214 = 16KB. Furthermore, in the event that A2
has a cache hit due to A1, we can add back the initially-omitted
comparisons to B1, . . . ,Bn to undo the approximation.
7 EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented SymSC using the LLVM compiler [48] and
Cloud9 [18],which is a symbolic execution engine formultithreaded
programs built upon KLEE [20]. We enhanced Cloud9 in three as-
pects. First, we extended its support for multi-threading by allow-
ing context switches prior to accessing global memory; the origi-
nal Cloud9 only allows context switches prior to executing a syn-
chronization primitive (e.g., lock/unlock). Second, we madeCloud9
fork new states to flip the execution order of two simultaneously
enabled events when they may be mapped to the same cache line;
the original Cloud9 does not care about cache lines. Third, wemade
Cloud9 record the address of each memory access along the execu-
tion, so it can incrementally build the cache-hit constraint. Based
on these enhancements, we implemented our cache timing leak
detector and optimized it for efficient constraint solving.
After compiling the C code of a program to LLVM bit-code, our
SymSC tool executes it symbolically to generate interleavings ac-
cording to Algorithm 2. The cache constraint at each memory ac-
cess is expressed in standard KQuery expressions defined in KLEE [20].
By solving these constraints, we can obtain a concrete execution
that showcases the leak, including a thread schedule, two input
values k1,k2 and the adversarial memory address.
7.1 Benchmarks
We evaluated SymSC on a diverse set of open-source cipher pro-
grams. Specifically, the first group has five programs from a light-
weight cryptographic system named FELICS [29], which was de-
signed for resource-constrained devices. The second group has four
programs from Chronos [27], a real-time Linux kernel. The third
group has four programs from the GNU library Libgcrypt [3], while
the remaining programs are from the LibTomCrypt [4], theOpenSSL [6],
and a recent publication [21]. They include multiple versions of
Table 3: Benchmark statistics: lines ofC code (LOC) and LLVM code
(LL), sensitive key-size (KS), and the memory accesses (MA).
Name LOC LL KS MA Name LOC LL KS MA
AES[6] 1,429 4,384 24 771 FCrypt[27] 437 1,623 12 428
AES[27] 1,368 4,144 24 788 KV_name[21] 1,350 1,402 4 19
Camellia[4] 776 5,319 16 1,301 LBlock[29] 930 4,010 10 1,618
CAST5[4] 735 2,790 16 909 Misty1[1] 391 1,199 16 270
CAST5[27] 883 4,190 16 1,180 Piccolo[29] 301 1,034 12 350
Chaskey[29] 248 638 16 242 PRESENT[29] 194 272 10 94
DES[3] 596 2,166 8 963 rfc2268 [3] 388 870 16 149
DES[27] 1,010 3,926 8 1,029 Seed[3] 607 3,535 16 979
Kasumi[1] 350 1224 16 259 TWINE[29] 256 562 10 229
Khazad[27] 838 463 16 123 Twofish[3] 1,048 4,510 16 1,180
several well-known algorithms such as AES [6, 27] and DES [3, 27],
which are useful in evaluating the impact of cipher implementa-
tions on the performance of SymSC.
Table 3 shows the statistics of these benchmark programs. The
LOC and LL columns denote the lines of C code and the corre-
sponding LLVM bit-code. TheKS column shows the size of the sen-
sitive input in bytes. The maximum number of memory accesses
on program paths of each benchmark is shown in theMA column,
which indicates the computational cost of the program.
Each program in the benchmark suite has from 194 to 1,429 lines
of C code. In total, there are 14,455 lines of C code, which compile
to 49,048 lines of LLVM bit-code. These numbers are considered
substantial because ciphers are typically compact programs with
highly computation-intensive operations, e.g., due to their use of
loops and lookup-table based transformations. For example, the
program named PRESENT has only 194 lines of C code but 8,233
memory accesses at run time.
We analyzed these benchmark programs using two types of caches:
direct-mapped cache and four-way set-associative cache. The cache
size is 64KB with each cache line consisting of 64 bytes; thus, there
are 64KB/64B = 1024 cache lines, which are typical in mainstream
computers today.
Our experiments were designed to answer two questions:
• Can SymSC detect cache-timing leaks exposed by concur-
rently running a program with other threads?
• Are the optimizations in Section 6 effective in reducing the
cost of symbolic execution and constraint solving?
We conducted all experiments with Ubuntu 12.04 Linux running on
a computer with a 3.40GHz CPU and 8GB RAM. For all evaluations
we set the timeout threshold to 1,600 minutes.
7.2 Results Obtained with Fixed Addresses
Table 4 shows our results obtained using fixed addresses in the
cache layout (Case 1 in Section 2.3). The first column shows the
benchmark name. The next three columns show the result of com-
puting the precise solution for our cache analysis problem. The last
three columns show the result of running the simplified, two-step
version, where the solution for ∃k1,k2 . τ (k1) , τ (k2) is computed
in two steps, by first computing a value of k1 and then computing a
value of k2. In each method, we show the number of interleavings
explored (#.Inter), the number of leaky memory accesses detected
(#.Test), and the execution time in minutes (m). For the two-step ap-
proach, we also show the number of leakage points detected after
the first step and after the second step.
Among these twenty programs, we detected leakage points in
four: ASE from OpenSSL [6], DES from Libgcrypt [3], FCrypt from
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Table 4: Results of leak detectionwithfixed addresses: Is the
program leaky w.r.t. the given thread?
Name
Precise Two-Step
#.Inter #.Test Time (m) #.Inter
#.Test
Time (m)
step1 / step2
AES[6] 57 55 430.2 57 55 / 55 140.3
AES[27] 1 0 288.9 1 1 / 0 41.4
Camellia[4] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
CAST5[4] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
CAST5[27] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
Chaskey[29] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
DES[3] 16 15 7.8 16 16 / 15 3.5
DES[27] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
FCrypt[27] 16 15 4.1 16 15 / 15 8.1
Kasumi[1] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.2
Khazad[27] 25 23 206.5 25 23 / 23 83.0
KV_Name[21] 1406 0 0.5 1406 1406 / 0 0.4
LBlock[29] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
Misty1[1] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
Piccolo[29] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
PRESENT[29] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
rfc2268[3] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
Seed[3] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
TWINE[29] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
Twofish[3] 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.2
Chronos [27], and Khazad fromChronos [27].Wemanually inspected
these four programs in a way similar to what is described in Sec-
tion 3.2, and confirmed that all these leakage points are realistic.
Furthermore, our two-step approach returned exactly the same re-
sults as the precise analysis for all benchmark programs, but in
significantly less time.
We also conducted our experiments using 4-way set-associative
cache instead of direct-mapped cache. The results of these exper-
iments are similar to the ones reported in Table 4. Therefore, we
omit them for brevity.
Nevertheless, the similarity is expected. For example, a 1024-
byte S-Boxwould bemapped to 16 consecutive cache lines in directed-
mapped cache as well as 4-way set-associative cache, provided that
the cache size is 64KB and the line size is 64-byte. The only minor
difference is that, in the 4-way set-associative cache, we need four
adversarial memory accesses from thread T2 to fully evict a cache
set. But if we have already detected the first adversarial address
(say addr), the remaining three could simply be addr+cache_size,
addr+2*cache_size, and addr+3*cache_size. Thus, there is no signif-
icant difference from analyzing direct-mapped cache.
7.3 Results Obtained with Symbolic Addresses
The results shown in Table 4 are useful, but also somewhat con-
servative. A more aggressive analysis is to assume the adversarial
thread T2 may access memory regions whose cache layout is sym-
bolic (refer to Case 2 in Section 2.3).
Table 5 shows the experimental results obtained using direct-
mapped cache and symbolic addresses in thread T2 (Case 2 in Sec-
tion 2.3). The first two columns show the benchmark name and the
maximum number of memory addresses accessed by an interleav-
ing at run time. The Precise column shows the result of computing
the precise solution for our cache analysis problem. The Two-Step
column shows the result of running the simplified version. In both
cases, we report the total number of interleavings explored by sym-
bolic execution (#.Inter), the number of leaky memory accesses de-
tected (#.Test), and the total execution time in minutes (m). For
Two-Step, the number of leaky accesses is further divided into two
Table 5: Results of leak detectionwith symbolic addresses: Is
the given program leaky w.r.t. any adversarial thread?
Name #.Acc
Precise Two-Step
#.Inter #.Test Time(m) #.Inter
#.Test
Time(m)
step1 / step2
AES [6] 1,026 224 220 1016.4 224 220 / 220 237.5
AES[27] 2,568 141 139 >1600 256 302 / 254 548.3
Camellia[4] 2,590 176 172 830.8 176 172 / 172 303.5
CAST5[4] 1,815 167 164 >1600 384 381 / 381 1337.4
CAST5[27] 1,392 183 180 >1600 384 381 / 381 1392.5
Chaskey[29] 1,380 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
DES[3] 2,135 144 127 38.6 144 164 / 127 27.2
DES[27] 2,539 119 114 >1600 194 187 / 183 1191.5
FCrypt[27] 428 64 60 15.1 64 60 / 60 20.1
Kasumi[1] 1,785 83 82 >1600 96 94 / 94 151.9
Khazad[27] 684 114 103 >1600 248 254 / 240 165.3
KV_Name[21] 140 1406 0 0.5 1406 1406 / 0 0.5
LBlock[29] 4,068 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
Misty1[1] 2,966 76 75 >1600 96 94 / 94 265.1
Piccolo[29] 5,103 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
PRESENT[29] 8,233 1 0 0.2 1 1 / 0 0.2
rfc2268[3] 3,190 113 112 303.4 113 112 / 112 42.9
Seed[3] 1,632 201 197 >1600 320 316 / 316 1505.1
TWINE[29] 10,492 1 0 0.1 1 1 / 0 0.1
Twofish[3] 12,400 2514 84 >1600 900 84,063 / 76 >1600
subcolumns: the leaky accesses detected after the first step and the
leaky accesses detected after the second step.
The results show that, for most of the benchmark programs,
the overhead of precisely solving our cache analysis is too high:
on nine of the twenty programs, it could not complete within the
time limit. In contrast, our two-step analysis was able to complete
nineteen out of the twenty programs. In terms of accuracy, our
two-step approach is almost as good as precise analysis: in all com-
pleted programs, they detected the same number of leakage points,
which indicate a possible combination of adversarial threads and
memory layout that can trigger timing leaks.
Our results also show that, for the same type of cryptographic
algorithms (such as AES), different implementations may lead to
drastically different overhead. For example, we detected 34 more
leakage points in the AES implementation of Chronos [27] than that
of OpenSSL [6]. However, the AES of Chronos took almost twice as
long for our tool to analyze. For DES the implementations from
Libgcrypt [3] and Chronos [27], we detected a slightly different
number of leakage points, but the time taken is significantly differ-
ent (27.1 minutes versus 1191.5 minutes). In contrast, for the two
versions of CAST5, we detected the same number of leakage points
in roughly the same amount of time.
For the benchmarkwhere Two-Step took a long time, we found it
is due to the increasing size of symbolic constraints which consist
of the addresses in S-Box accesses. Typically the later a S-Box ac-
cess in a loop, the larger its symbolic address expression would be.
In Twofish, SymSC timed out because it encountered a large num-
ber of "may-be-related" event pairs (i.e., accessing the same S-Box
but not the same cache line), which made SMT solving difficult.
7.4 Discussion
Based on the results, we answer the two research questions as fol-
lows. First, SymSC is able to identify cache timing leaks in concur-
rent programs automatically. Specifically, using symbolic addresses
in the adversarial thread allows us to demonstrate the possibility
of triggering leaks in a concurrent system, whereas using fixed ad-
dresses in the analysis allows us to show that such leaks are more
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practical. Second, SymSC’s performance optimization techniques
are effective in reducing the computational overhead, which is demon-
strated on a diverse set of real-world cipher programs.
SymSC searches for sensitive inputs as well as an interleaving
schedule that, together, trigger divergent cache behaviors. If an
individual program path has a constant cache behavior, e.g., all
the memory accesses refer to fixed memory addresses regardless
of the value of the sensitive input, then timing leaks are impossi-
ble. By checking for and leveraging such conditions, SymSC can
reduce the computation cost even further. For instance, with naive
exploration, SymSC would have generated 1,406 interleavings for
the benchmark program named KV_name. However, with the above
analysis, it does not have to generate any interleaving.
In this example, KV_name’s 4-byte symbolic input only affects
the branch conditions but does not taint any memory access ad-
dress. Thus, many paths are explored by symbolic execution. How-
ever, no leak is detected on these paths.
Another example is Chaskey, which has a single program path,
together with 1,380 memory accesses on this path. These memory
addresses are all independent of the 16-Byte symbolic input, which
means no leakage point can be found by SymSC.
8 RELATED WORK
Side-channel leaks have been exploited in a wide range of sys-
tems [28, 36–38, 43–45, 51, 54, 57]. For timing side channels, in
particular, many analysis and verification techniques have been de-
veloped. For example, Chen et al. [23] proposed a technique named
Cartesian Hoare Logic [58] for proving that the timing leaks of a
program are bounded. Antonopoulos et al. [8] proposed a similar
method for proving the absence of timing channels: it partitions
the program paths in a way that, if individual partitions are proved
to be timing attack resilient, the entire program is also timing at-
tack resilient. However, these methods only consider instruction-
induced timing while ignoring the cache.
In the context of analyzing real-time systems, there is a large
body of work on cache analysis [49, 50, 52], with the goal of esti-
mating the worst-case execution time (WCET). Various techniques
including abstract interpretation [61], symbolic execution [12, 21],
and interpolation [25] have been used to compute the upper bound
of execution time along all programpaths. Chattopadhyay et al. [22]
also developed CHALICE to quantify information leaked through
the cache side channel, but the focuswas on dependencies between
sensitive data and misses/hits on the CPU’s data cache.
Doychev et al. [30] developed CacheAudit, a tool relying on ab-
stract interpretation based static analysis to analyze cache timing
leaks. Wang et al. [64] developed CacheD, an offline trace analy-
sis tool for detecting key-dependent program points in a cipher
program that may be vulnerable to side channel attacks. Sung et
al. [60] developed CANAL, an LLVM transformation that models
cache timing behaviors for standard verification tools. However,
these techniques handle sequential programs or traces only.
Pasareanu et al. [55] developed a symbolic execution tool for
reasoning about the degree of leaked information, assuming the at-
tacker can take multiple measurements. The test input that causes
themaximum amount of leakage is computed usingMax-SMT solv-
ing. Bultan et al. [10, 17, 19] developed techniques for quantifying
information leaked by string operations. Their method can handle
both single and multiple runs [10]: it applies probabilistic symbolic
execution to collect path constraints of a single run and then uses
these constraints to compute the leakage of multiple runs. Phan et
al. [56] also developed a symbolic attack model and formulated the
problem of test generation to obtain the maximum leakage as an
optimization problem.
However, in all these existing methods, the program is assumed
to be sequential. In contrast, SymSC focuses on concurrency-induced
leaks. Although Barthe et al. [11] proposed an abstract interpreta-
tion technique based on CacheAudit [30] to track the cache state of
a program with concurrent adversary, the adversary is a separate
process (that tries to probe and set the cache states), not a thread.
Furthermore, users have to provide data inputs and interleaving
schedules, whereas SymSC generates them automatically.
Stefan et al. [59] proposedan instruction-based schedulingmech-
anism in information flow control systems running on a single
CPU, to avoid cache timing attacks introduced by classic time-based
schedulers. Therefore, it is a system-level mitigation technique. In
contrast, SymSC focuses on detecting whether a security-critical
program may leak sensitive information through the timing side
channel due to interference from other threads.
Our state-space reduction in SymSC is related to partial order
reduction (POR) [35] in model checking, but with an important
difference. In classic POR [9, 24, 42, 47, 63, 69], one would typically
select representative interleavings from equivalence classes, which
are defined based on standard data-conflict and data-dependence
relations. However, in SymSC, they must be broadened to also in-
clude functionally-independent events that may access the same
cache line.
So far, SymSC focuses on cases where the adversarial thread
flushes a single cache line. In the terminology of side-channel anal-
ysis, this corresponds to first-order attacks. If, on the other hand,
the adversarial thread is capable of flushing multiple cache lines,
it may be more likely to trigger timing leaks. Such cases would
be called high-order attacks. We leave the analysis of high-order
attacks for future work.
Besides leak detection, there are side-channel leak mitigation
techniques that can generate countermeasures automatically, e.g.,
using compiler-like program transformations [7, 13, 53, 65] or SMT
solver based formal verification [15, 32, 33, 68] and program syn-
thesis [16, 31, 34, 62] techniques. However, none of these emerg-
ing techniques was designed for, or applicable to, cache timing side
channels due to concurrency.
9 CONCLUSIONS
Wehave presented a symbolic executionmethod for detecting cache
timing leaks in a computation that runs concurrently with an ad-
versarial thread. Our method systematically explores both thread
paths and their interleavings, and relies on an SMT solver to detect
divergent cache behaviors. Our experiments show that real cipher
programs do have concurrency related cache timing leaks, and al-
though it remains unclear to what extent such leaks are exploited
in practice, our method computes concrete data inputs and inter-
leaving schedules to demonstrate these leaks are realistic. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first symbolic execution method
for detecting cache timing side-channel leaks due to concurrency.
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